BRAIN v. MARFELL.

the law of Massachusetts. See also Wilson Bryan's Case, 1 Cr.
C. 0. 151 (1804), where a person refusing to be sworn as a juryman, not belonging to any religious society whose principles for-bade taking an oath, was committed until he consented thereto.
This would seem to have been under the laws and Bill of Rights
of Maryland. Refusing to ansuer before a grand jury and insolence to them, is a contempt of a court of the United States:
United States v. Oanton, 1 Cr. C. C. 150. But a refusal to answer is justifiable if an assertion of a constitutional right, and a
commitment for contempt is illegal, and may be examined in the
Supreme Court by certiorari,even if not on a habeas corpus. This
was under the New York statutes: People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74.
If a witness remain in the court-room from which he has been
excluded by order of court, it is a contempt: People v. Boscovitch,
20 Cal. 436.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.

Philadelphia.
(To be continued.)
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BRAIN v. MARFELL.
The defendant sold to the plaintiff a spring and the right of conveying the watet
therefrom through a pipe under the defendant's land without any interruption or
disturbance by the defendant, his heirs or assigns, or any other person or persons
whatsoever. A railway company purchased from the defendant land in the pro.imity of the spring, without recourse to their compulsory powers. The effect of the
works of the railway company was to drain the water from the land before it reached
the spring, in consequence of which the spring became dry, and the water did not
flow through the plaintiff's pipes. The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of
contract. Hed, that the defendant had only conveyed the flow of water after it had
reached the spring, and therefore the draining of the water before it reached the
spring was no breach.

THIS was an action for breach of contract on the part of the
defendant in permitting an interruption of the flow of water from
a spring on his land to the plaintiff's house.
The plaintiff and defendant, were adjoining land-owners, and
entered into an agreement the material part of which was as
follows: "The said James William Marfell, as absolute owner in
fee-simple in possession of the aforesaid freehold land, shall sell
unto the said Alfred James Brain, and the said Alfred James
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Brain shall purchase, at or for the price or sum of 201., all that
well or spring hereinbefore mentioned or referred to, and the sole
right to the water therein and obtainable therefrom, and the right
and liberty by the means aforesaid to conduct and convey the said
water, and from henceforth for ever hereafter to continue the flow
and keep good the stream of water therefrom through the aforesaid freehold land to the said dwelling-house of the said Alfred
James Brain in manner aforesaid, and also the right and liberty
at all times hereafter whenever occasion shall require the same to
open and repair and continue and improve the said drain for the
purpose of continuing, perpetuating, or improving the stream or
flow of water from the said well or spring to the said dwellinghouse and premises of the said Alfred James Brain for the uses
and purposes aforesaid, the intent and meaning of the said parties
hereto being that for and in consideration of the said purchasemoney or sum of 201., he, the said Alfred James Brain, his heirs
and assigns, shall from henceforth for ever hereafter be absolutely
entitled to the said well or spring, water, rights, and premises, so
agreed to be sold to and purchased by the said Alfied James
Brain as aforesaid, and shall have, hold, use, possess and enjoy the
same well or spring, water, rights and premises, and each and
every of them unconditionally, and without any denial, interruption, disturbance, claim, or demand whatsoever of or by him, the
said James William Marfell, his heirs, assigns or any other person or persons whomsoever."
Under this agreement the plaintiff enjoyed the flow of water
from the spring until 1874, when the Forest of Dean Railway
Company purchased from the defendant a small piece of land close
to the field in which was the spring and pipe, but not touching
either of them. The company purchased the land voluntarily, but
it appeared they could have done so under their compulsory powers.
A tunnel was made by the company through this piece of land,
and in the construction of the tunnel a shaft was sunk from the
surface of the land to the tunnel. The shaft and tunnel acted as
a drain to the land, the spring in consequence became dry,
and the plaintiff lost the supply of water, and so brought his
action for damages for breach of contract in permitting the flow of
water from the spring to be lost to the plaintiff.
The action was tried before PoLLocK, B., without a jury, at the
Hereford Summer Assizes, and judgment was given for the defend-
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ant, upon the grounds that the railway company were not assigns
within the meaning of the agreement, and that, inasmuch as they
might have obtained the land under their compulsory powers, the
case came within Bailey v. De Crespigny, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 180.
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
Powell, Q. C., and A. T. Lawrence, in support of the appeal.
-The flow of water from the well has been interrupted by the
act of the railway company in preventing the water from reaching
the spring, for which the defendant is responsible by the terms of
the agreement. [Lord COLERIDGE, C. J., referred to Chasemore
v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349.] That case is distinguishable, for
here the defendant covenanted that the plaintiff should enjoy the
flow of water without interruption, and it was immaterial in what
way the cause of that interruption arose. They were not heard on
the question as to whether the railway company were assigns within the meaning of the agreement.
J. 0. Griffitts, Q.I C., and Jeif, for the defendant, were not
called on.
Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this judgment
should be affirmed, though, as at present advised, not in the sense
that Mr. Baron POLLOcK decided, for in one sense the company
were undoubtedly assigns of the defendant, but I have some doubt
whether they were so within the meaning of the agreement. I
doubt very much if the defendant meant to covenant against the
acts of his assigns of his property other than that mentioned in
the agreement. However, it is not necessary to decide that point.
Assuming that the company were assigns within the meaning of
the agreement. I am clearly of opinion that neither the defendant
nor his assigns have done anything in contravention of the agreement. Now it has been decided as matter of law that there is no
right of action for draining a well dry unless there has been an
interference with the physical or defined flow or stream running in
a defined channel or in a channel capable of being defined. See
Chasemore v. Richards. It has been rightly contended that there
is nothing to prevent persons extending or limiting their commonlaw rights by agreement. The question is, whether the agreement
in the present case has given the plaintiff a more extended right
so as to restrict in any way the defendant's common-law right of
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draining his land. If it has not, then the plaintiff cannot recover
in this action. All that has been conveyed is the well, and the
right to the water in the well and obtainable therefrom, and the
right to have the water conveyed therefrom through the pipe. In
a case on the Western Circuit, the name of which I do not remember, it was held that in a conveyance of a spring with the water
flowing from it the spring-head with the defined stream of water
flowing from it was meant, and that the interference with the water
before the head was formed, or before the water began to run in a
defined channel, was not actionable. There is nothing in the words
of this agreement to include the right in the plaintiff to prevent the
defendant from interfering by means of underground operations
with the flow of water before it reached the spring-head. There
are no such words, and we ought not to introduce them. It has
been argued that such a construction will operate as a hardship to
the plaintiff, for the defendant might sink a well close to the spring
and drain off the water. On the other hand, if the construction
contended for by the plaintiff were upheld,,the defendant might
not be able to sink a well for draining .water anywhere on his land
if it would have the effect of diminishing the flow of water to the
spring. It has been said that by the terms of this agreement the
grantor retains the right of defeating his own grant. That is,
hardly correct, for he has not granted away his common-law right
of draining his land. All we have to do is to construe this agreement, and according to the true construction, the defendant has
committed no breach.
BRAMWELL, L. J.-I am by no means clear that the company
were the assigns of the defendant. Assuming that they were, I
doubt very much whether the word assigns does not mean assigns
of the spot itself i. e., of the spring, and not of the land adjacent.
The plaintiff must fail on the ground that the inter1hrence with
the water was not brought about by an act contemplated by the
agreement. It is manifest that the agreement was to define the
plaintiff's right, without it the defendant would have bad a 'perfect right to -tap the well if he pleased. It was intended that the
plaintiff should have the right to water in the well, and which
should flow therefrom along the pipe. If the plaintiff's argument
were sound, the defendant could not do any acts on his own lanil
which would have the effect of diminishing the supply of water to
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the well.
land.

In other words, he would be limited in the use of his

L. J.-I agree that this appeal must be dismissed. A
spring is a natural chasm into which the water has got by percolation, and out of which it either percolates or rises in a defined
channel. It is perfectly clear that that which was conveyed in
this case was the water in the well, and which would flow therefrom along the pipe to the plaintiff's house, but that that water
which would percolate and flow elsewhere than through the pipe
was not included, and no right was conveyed to the water before it
reached the spring. The company undoubtedly prevented water
from percolating into the spring, and drained away water that had
percolated out of the spring, but had not flowed along the pipe,
neither of which acts can be said to be a breach of the agreement.
Appeal dismissed.
BRETT,

The American law quite generally
agrees with the English as to underground water, viz., that no action lies
for diverting underground water which
is simply percolating or straining through
the earth, and not collected in any visible
or tangible stream. Such water is considered a part of the soil itself, like
rocks and stones, and may be taken
away in the same manner and to the
same extent as the soil itself can be,
although the effect and consequence to
the adjoining owner may be very different: See Chase v. Sih'erstone, 62 Me.
175 ; Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316 ;
45 N. Y. 352; 11osier v. Caldwell, 7
Nev. 363; Green af v. Francis, 18
Pick. 117; Wilson v. New Bedrford,
108 Mass. 265; Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294; Chatfield v. Wfilson, 28
Vt. 49; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn.
533; Goddard on Easements (Am. ed.)
tit. Water. The authorities are nearly uniform as to this ; if there be any exception
or modification of this right of every riparian proprietor to underground percolating water, it is to be found in New
Hampshire, where the decisions do not
seem to recognise the right so absolutely
as elsewhere ; but they hold that the
right should be subject somewhat to the
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rights of others, and exercised only in a
manner and to an extent reasonable
under all the circumstances of each
individual case. See Bassett v. ailsbury Manufacturing Co., 49 N. H. 569;
Swet v. Cutts, 50 Id. 439.
Whether this right ever depends upon
the motive with which it is exercised, is
not universally agreed. Some apparently hold that no man can "maliciously and wantonly" cutoff the water
which supplies another's well, even when
he might do so for the bona fide purpose
of improving or using his own estate.
See Greenleafv. Francis, 18 Pick. 121 ;
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528;
Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316. And
such is said to have been the rule of
the civil law: Lord WENSLEYDALE in
Chasemore v. Richards, 5 H. & N. 990;
7 H. L. C. 349.
On the other hand, in Chatfield v.
Wilson, 28 Vt 49, it was distinctly
decided that it was immaterial with what
motive the act was done; and the
remarks of PUTMAN, J., in Greenleafv.
Francis, were declared to be only obiter
dictum. See, also, Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. 294; Rawston v. Taylor, 11
e/pe
Exeb. 369, MARTIN, B., p. 378;
v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39; Chin 'u

